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Security on real-time systems (RTS) is an emerging re-
search topic due to huge growth of various applications such
as avionic systems, industrial control systems, life-critical
surgical machines and Internet of Things (IoT) devices. The
characteristics of predictability and determinism in RTS make
it vulnerable and magnify the consequences of attacks. Over
the years, a variety of security mechanisms have been devel-
oped making RTS more secure while correspondent attacks
were proposed. Hence, examining flaws of RTS indirectly
facilitates the development of security technologies.
Recent studies introduce diverse attacks exploiting side
channels such as timing behavior, memory usage and energy
consumption upon RTS. Different from most typical attacks
that aim to breach the system, emerging side-channel attacks
tend to hide beneath user tasks and steal information silently.
The leaked information could be either the direct message that
is valuable to adversaries or the indirect data that could be used
to trigger further collaborative attacks.
To adversaries, a good attack should minimize the foot-
prints and maximize the outcome upon it’s target, that is
launching the attack with precision. To achieve this goal, the
ability to locate the start time of the target becomes vitally
important. Therefore, in this paper, we propose an attack
scheme which integrates a schedule-based side-channel attack
that can reconstruct the schedule of the RTS giving sufficient
information to predict and approximate the start time of any
selected task.
The proposed attack scheme manipulates the correlations
between each pair of task priorities and utilizes the idle
task, which is available in most operating systems and is
usually overlooked in both offense and defense, to capture
busy intervals with taking it’s advantage of being the actual
lowest priority task on the system. Additionally, a series
of algorithms for reconstruction of schedules are developed,
providing comprehensive analysis over captured busy intervals.
Eventually, the attack scheme is implemented and evaluated on
both a scheduling simulator and a realistic platform (FreeRTOS
running on Zedboard, an ARM-based development board).
In this paper, we specifically target at the fixed-priority
hard real-time system with running rate-monotonic (RM)
scheduling algorithm because such system has the most strict
constraints in scheduling and, therefore, is more vulnerable to
the schedule-based side-channel attack. In the mean time, the
vendor-based adversary model is considered since it is applied
to most of the real-time systems that are developed with larger
scale, which is more reasonable to launch the proposed attack.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are:
• Propose an attack scheme that integrates exploitation
of schedule-based side channels upon fixed-priority
real-time systems in Section II.
• Develop a series of algorithms to reconstruct the
schedule based on captured busy intervals and gotten
system profile (period and execution time of each task
in the targeted real-time system) in Section III.
• Implement and evaluate the proposed attacks on both
the developed scheduling simulator and the embedded
platform (FreeRTOS running on Zedboard) in Sec-
tion IV.
II. SYSTEM AND ATTACK MODEL
A. System Model
In this paper, the fixed-priority scheduling model is used.
The system with a task set Γ = {τ1, ..., τn} containing n
periodic hard real-time tasks is considered. Each task τi,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, is characterized by pi, ci, di and pri(τi) in
which pi is the period, ci specifies the worst execution time,
di shows the deadline and pri(τi) indicates the priority of the
task τi. Note that all tasks in Γ are indexed by descending
priorities and priorities are distinct, i.e., pri(τi) > pri(τi+1).
Additionally, let HP (τi), HP (τi) ⊂ Γ, denote the task set
that contains tasks with priorities higher than τi. Similarly,
LP (τi), LP (τi) ⊂ Γ, represents the task set that has tasks
with lower priorities than τi. Besides, we define the notation
Γ(i,n) = {τi, τi+1, ..., τn} to be a subset of the task set Γ.
Thus, according to this definition, Γ(1,n) has equivalent task
set as Γ.
For ease of illustration of the proposed analysis algorithm
in later sections, the schedule of the specified hard real-time
system is modeled by a set of intervals, V . Furthermore, V of
a schedule consists of two types of interval subsets: (i) busy
interval [1] set, defined as W = {ω1, ..., ωm} which contains
m busy intervals and (ii) idle interval set, ID = V −W as
shown in Figure 1. For each busy interval ωk, 1 ≤ k ≤ m,
it comprises zero or more jobs of τi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, which are
being scheduled, executed and complete within this interval.
Let Nk(τi), 0 ≤ Nk(τi), denote the number of jobs of τi that
are enclosed in ωk, thus the duration of the busy interval can
be computed as:





(Nk(τi) · ci) (1)
To depict the schedule of a busy interval, let Sk be an array
set and Sk(τi) represents one of the array storing the start times
for each job of τi in ωk. For example, τi has Nk(τi) = 2 jobs
in ωk, thus Sk(τi) contains two separate start times for the two
jobs. Meanwhile, let T0(ωk) be the start time of ωk. Ultimately,
it is sufficient to depict ωk with a tuple {T0(ωk), C(ωk), Sk}
where T0(ωk) is the start time of ωk, C(ωk) is it’s length and
Sk specifies the start times of all enclosed jobs.
Note that the start time of a job is used to picture the
schedule in a busy interval here instead of it’s arrival time
because our focus is more on the output of the schedule in
this paper. The arrival time pinpoints the instant when a job
is ready to be scheduled and being put in the ready queue
but not the instant when a job is truly being executed, where
the former requires further RM scheduling simulation to get
corresponding start times. However, it’s worth mentioning that,
in our analysis algorithm, inferring arrival times is still a
necessary process before the start times can be computed.
Therefore, it is wise to define Ak(τi) as a set of arrival time
array that indicates the arrival time for each job of τi in ωk.
To make it clear, the following summarizes the denotations
for the modeled schedule:
• W : busy interval set
• ωk: a busy interval with a tuple {T0(ωk), C(ωk), Sk},
ωk ∈W
• T0(ωk): start time of ωk
• C(ωk): duration of the busy interval ωk, which can
be computed by 1
• Sk(τi): an array storing the start times for each job of
τi in ωk
• Ak(τi): an array storing the arrival times for each job
of τi in ωk
• Nk(τi): the number of jobs of task τi in ωk
B. Adversary Model (or Threat Model?)
Getting connected to the targeted system and introducing
some flaws for advanced compromises are typically the first
step in most attack schemes [3]. However, real-time systems
inherently have restricted connectivity because of the hard real-
time constraints as well as the limited hardware resources.
Besides, system designers tend to make the real-time system as
simple as possible and leave additional functions like internet
access on a separate platform if necessary. For example,
airplanes nowadays offer internet access during the flight, but
such function is provided by the device that is independent to
the avionic real-time system. For this reason, typical methods
of intruding a generic computer system are not always appli-
cable to a real-time system.
Rather than hack into a system through an internet based
command line interface or a web based service, an attack
upon a real-time system usually involves some work in social
engineering to fill the air gap between the adversary and the
insulated real-time system. A good example to demonstrate
the attack in such scenario is Stuxnet that took place in Iran
in 2010 [2]. In this case, the targeting industrial control system
of the enrichment facilities is independent to the publicly
accessible internet, which means the attacker can not reach the
target in a typical way. Instead, Stuxnet is initially delivered
by a removable flash drive and intelligently launches the attack
upon the selected system.
Another crucial point in the attack scheme upon real-time
systems is the knowledge and efforts from insiders. The insid-
ers can be either the developers of the system provider or the
managers inside the companies that purchase the compromised
system. Again, taking the case of Stuxnet as an example, the
development of the malware that targets at a specific type
of industrial control systems is believed to require a certain
level of understanding towards both hardware architecture and
software design of the targeting facility. Since the necessary
knowledge and information are not open to the public, insiders
are considered to play a vital role here in both developing
Stuxnet and filling the air gap.
Similarly, the above trick can be applied to a vendor based
real-time system. In a vendor based real-time system, various
components from different vendors are integrated to construct
a complex device. Each component is controlled and monitored
by one or more tasks in which the drivers are developed and
provided by correspondent vendors. Since it is difficult for the
system integrator to inspect every detail of the written code
from participating vendors, it leaves an uncovered flaw on
vendor’s side for adversaries to exploit. Rather than directly
attack the system in run-time, an attacker may choose to
compromise the driver of which the vendor has less security
protection and loose code management during the development
phase. Under normal circumstances, the adversaries who inject
the malicious function in the vendor-owned task may be the
developers among the faculty members of the same vendor.
In some special cases, the attacker can even be the system
integrator himself or herself.
Therefore, according to the described scenario, it is likely
that attackers are able to acquire a certain degree of system
information, i.e., hardware architecture (CPU model number),
OS version, software structure, user task profiles and CPU
utilization, etc. Even worse, more hidden but valuable infor-
mation behind the hard real-time system may potentially be
revealed since the system behavior is mostly deterministic
and predictable. By having this information along with one
or more accessible tasks on hand, attackers stand at a greatly
advantageous position in developing a more sophisticated and
comprehensive attack scheme against the real-time system.
Other than trying to aggressively crash the system in a
typical attack scheme, the attack presented in this paper tends
to utilize side-channels to scout the system behavior but at
the same time remain undiscovered throughout the attack.
The gathered metadata is then analyzed together with the
system profile gotten previously to reconstruct the complete
schedule which allows attackers to assault any selected task
with precision. By doing so, it reduces attacking footprints
and lowers the likelihood of being caught by system security
guards.
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However, the information available on side-channels differs
from task to task, and the attack strategy varies according to
the task set that an attacker owns in the beginning. Thus, it’s
important to understand what an attacker can learn from a set




In a real-time system that uses Rate-Monotonic scheduling
algorithm, each task is prioritized based on it’s period instead
of one’s purpose or security level. Thus, it is possible that an
insecure task with a short period is assigned a relatively higher
priority, making it superior to others with lower priorities
in scheduling. The preemptability of high priority task gives
attackers opportunities to launch a variety of attacks against
those to be preempted. On the other hand, although tasks with
lower priorities are seemingly valueless, the nature of being
preempted makes them exceptionally useful in monitoring the
system behavior, for example, measuring the execution time of
the task that preempts it. Hence, each priority level is actually
beneficial to attackers in different ways.
Like we described earlier, it is rational that an attacker is
likely to possess one or more legitimate tasks in a vendor-based
real-time system, hence, in this attack model, we particularly
focus on the information leaked through the exploitation of
priority correlations from clean ones to malicious ones. Let
H ⊂ Γ be the set of compromised tasks, and let hj denote
any compromised task in H , where hj ≡ τj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Based on priority assignments, any malicious and clean task
pair can be characterized with one of the three correlations:
pri(hj) > pri(τi), pri(hj) < pri(τi) and pri(hj) = pri(τi)
as shown in Figure 2.
1) pri(hj) > pri(τi)
In the fixed-priority scheduling, a higher priority
task can preempt any lower priority task when the
Figure 2. Examples of task priority correlations: (a) pri(hj) > pri(τi). (b)
pri(hj) < pri(τi). (c) pri(hj) = pri(τi).
former is ready and being scheduled at all times.
That is, hj can preempt τi if pri(hj) > pri(τi).
With the privilege to preempt τi, hj can trigger an
attack upon τi to secretly steal information, i.e.,
gauging the memory usage of τi by launching a
side-channel cache timing attack.
Furthermore, the same correlation can be applied
to hj against any other task that has lower priority.
Therefore, those tasks in task set Γ(1,j−1) are
potentially vulnerable to attacks from malicious task
hj . It is true for all tasks when the malicious task
is at highest priority, i.e., Γ(1,n−1) is under threat
of hn. However, when there are multiple tasks that
have priorities lower than hj , it is hard for hj to
identify which task it is preempting as well as to
differentiate valuable information of any specific
task from the captured data.
2) pri(hj) < pri(τi)
In contrast to the previous condition, in the case that
hj has lower priority than τi, hj is preempted by τi
when τi is active. Since hj can learn for how long
and when it has been interrupted by keeping track
of the global timer, τi indirectly leaks it’s execution
time ci and potentially it’s arrival time to hj .
Again, this correlation can be extended to hj against
the task set Γ(j+1,n). In other words, hj is able
to observe the execution time and arrival time of
any task in Γ(j+1,n). When the malicious task is
at lowest priority, h1, it has potential learning the
most information from all other higher priority tasks,
Γ(2,n). Nevertheless, since more than one task can
be scheduled simultaneously and preempt hj , the
interrupted interval observed by hj is actually a
composition of computation times of arbitrary tasks
in Γ(j+1,n), which makes hj difficult to directly
manipulate this interval without further analysis.
3) pri(hj) = pri(τi)
In RM scheduling, two or more tasks are assigned the
same priority if they have the same period. Round-
robin scheduling is adopted when multiple tasks with
the same priority arrive and are ready to execute. In
such case, a task will not be scheduled until the other
one is finished. From attacker’s point of view, it offers
hj an opportunity to be scheduled right after the end
of an execution of τi. This character is beneficial to
attacks like cache timing attack in which the later one
can gauge cache usage amount of an execution from
previous one.
Manipulation of Task Priority Correlation
As what we’ve introduced, every priority correlation has dif-
ferent advantage for attacks. Nevertheless, those characteristics
are more like complementary to each other rather than ben-
eficial to attackers individually. With just one task on hand,
attackers are hard to launch attacks over any designated task
with high precision.
In pri(hj) > pri(τi) condition, hj can periodically launch
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cache timing attack to gauge cache usage amount upon lower
priority tasks, but hj doesn’t have sufficient intel to locate
the start point of any task. On the other hand, the task hj
with pri(hj) < pri(τi) can observe execution times of higher
priority tasks hence potentially know the start times of those
tasks. It turns out that attackers can gain largest benefit from
these priority correlations if they possess two or more tasks.
For example, if an attacker aims to attack the victim τi and
has compromised two tasks, hi−1 with lower priority and hi+1
with higher priority, then hi−1 can be used to observe and
pinpoint the start time of the task τi and hi+1 can be used
to fire the cache timing attack once if receives the triggering
event from hi−1.
Extend from the above example, if an attacker has multiple
targets in the system, then it’s easier for the attacker to
compromise the lowest priority task, h1, that can monitor
execution times of all tasks and the highest priority task, hn,
that can launch attacks upon arbitrary tasks. However, lowest
priority task h1 is also a periodic task, thus it has limits in
monitoring others when it is suspended.
Idle Task Manipulation
In order to monitor all tasks at all times, we propose to hijack
the idle task in replacement of the lowest priority task. Idle
task, by definition, is the function that the scheduler calls
when there is no active task or scheduled task waiting in
ready queue. The way that the idle task is implemented in
practice varies from system to system. Different from generic
computers where systems either enter sleep mode or lower the
CPU frequency when idling, real-time systems that require
predictability and real-timeness tend to keep CPUs up and
consume unused slack time. Take FreeRTOS as an example,
it maintains an idle task which contains nothing but a infinite
while loop to exhaust the idle time.
Therefore, it is rational to say that idle task is physically
the lowest priority task in a real-time system. It inherits all
potentials from the legitimate lowest priority task h1, yet it
has no limit in period, i.e., idle task has an infinite deadline.
With the specified characteristics, idle task is actually
monitoring execution state of a system rather than any specific
task. What the idle task can capture are busy intervals, W as
defined earlier in System Model section, that are composed
of arbitrary subset in Γ. Since RM scheduling is static, the
compositions of busy intervals as well as the schedule should
be predictable and deterministic. By analyzing captured busy
intervals along with the system profile (the number of tasks,
periods and execution times) that is available to attackers in a
vendor-based real-time system, the attackers should be able to
reconstruct whole schedule of the system.
Attack Scheme
The goal of whole attack scheme is to locate an execution (job)
of a selected task and launch attacks over it with minimum
footprint. The attack utilizes side channels to collect hidden
data (i.e., busy intervals) and reconstruct the system schedule
which can be used to predict the next start time of the specified
task.
As shown in Figure 3, everything starts with the compro-
mised task hi which an attacker owns legally. The task hi
maintains a state machine that injects a malicious function
into idle task in run time. Once the injection is complete, task
hi switches back to normal state and continues it’s original
and legal mission. For hijacked idle task part, it performs
another state machine that has three stages: (i) capturing busy
intervals, (ii) analyzing busy intervals (or inferring context of
busy intervals) and (iii) triggering attacks. The first two stages
will be discussed in later sections. The last stage, triggering
attacks, is to predict the next closest start time of a pre-
selected target based on the reconstructed schedule and issue
a triggering event for task hi to launch further attacks.
In the next section, we will elaborate how the algorithm
performed in hijacked idle task works to capture busy intervals
and reconstruct the schedule.
III. RECONSTRUCTION OF SCHEDULE
A. Overview
The algorithm introduced in this section is performed in
hijacked idle task. The final goal of this algorithm is to provide
sufficient information to other malicious tasks to carry on
more attacks. The output of this algorithm is the start time
of a job that can help locate the execution interval of the
targeted task in run time. However, without knowing whole
schedule, it’s hard to find or predict the start time for the
job of specified task correctly and accurately and eventually
complete the ultimate attack. Therefore, reconstructing the
schedule becomes crucially important to the success of whole
attack scheme.
The algorithm is separated into two parts: (1) capturing
busy intervals and (2) analysis of busy intervals.
1) Capturing Busy Intervals
The first part is to capture busy intervals by
measuring duration of being preempted in idle task.
It keeps monitoring and capturing until it reaches at
least one hyper-period long. This gives us a set of
blank busy intervals, W = {ω1, ..., ωm}, with start
time of each ω, T0(ωk), and it’s duration, C(ωk).
Start times for the jobs, Sk, in each busy interval are
Figure 3. Attack route of the schedule-based attack scheme.
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still missing at this point, which is the main mission
of the second step.
2) Analysis of Busy Intervals (or Inference of Content
of Busy Intervals)
The second part takes the busy interval set, W ,
from the first part and the system profile (period
and execution time of each task) as input to infer
the number of jobs and tasks involved in each busy
interval independently, which is finding Nk(τi) value
for each task τi in each busy interval ωk. Once Nk(τi)
is known, the algorithm then starts iterating busy in-
tervals to infer the arrival time for each task, Ak(τi).
With arrival time of each job available in all busy
intervals, we pass it into a simplified RM scheduling
simulator that can generate correspondent start times,
Sk for selected busy interval ωk. If necessary, by
iterating every busy interval to get Sk, 1 ≤ k ≤ m,
we can reconstruct whole schedule. Ultimately, the
reconstructed schedule is ready to serve for further
attacks.
The rest of the part in this section illustrates the detail of
each step for both parts.
B. Capture of Busy Intervals
Recall the illustration from the system model section, a
schedule can be represented by V = ID + W , thus getting
busy intervals W can potentially reconstruct whole intervals
V since they are like shadow of the schedule. Also, because
of the determinism in a fixed-priority hard real-time system,
the scheduling of a given task set is predictable. As a result,
the schedule repeats every hyper-period, and the hyper-period
of the task set γ = {τ1, ..., τn} can be calculated by getting
the least common multiple (LCM) of task’s periods:
HyperPeriod = LCM(p1, ..., pn)
From this characteristic, we know that the number of
the busy intervals reflected from such schedule is limited.
Therefore, getting busy intervals within one hyper-period is
sufficient for depicting a schedule of a given hard real-time
system that uses RM scheduling.
To capture a busy interval, the idle task takes global timer,
which is available and accessible to all tasks in most systems,
as a reference to inspect whether or not the idle task has
been preempted. This is done by keeping a loop to read the
global timer and compare it with the time stored from last
loop. If nothing preempts the idle task during a loop, then the
difference between two time points remains below an unit of
idle task execution time. In contrast, if the difference is greater
than expected, then there must have a preemption occurred. In
such case, a busy interval, ωk, is found. The duration that
the idle task is preempted is taken for C(ωk) and the start
time of this duration is assigned to T0(ωk). The algorithm for
capturing a busy interval is presented as Algorithm 1.
The above algorithm of capturing one busy interval re-
peats until it collects all busy intervals within one hyper-
period. Eventually, we will be able to get a busy interval set
W = {ω1, ..., ωm} for one hyper-period. Each busy interval ωk
contains it’s start time T0(ωk) and measured duration C(ωk).
Algorithm 1 Capture a busy interval
1: {GT : global timer}
2: {t0 : current time stamp}
3: {t−1 : last time stamp}
4:
5: t−1 ← GT
6: duration← 0
7: while duration ≤ idle task execution time unit do
8: t0 ← GT
9: duration← (t0 − t−1)
10: t−1 ← t0
11: end while
12: return t0, duration
This busy interval set W is then passed to the following
function for deeper analysis.
C. Inference of Nk(τi)
Despite getting sufficient busy intervals from the last step,
the content of each busy interval is still missing. Currently the
captured busy intervals are just black boxes to us. Thus, in this
step, the target is to figure out the number of jobs for each task
in every busy interval, that is finding Nk(τi), 1 ≤ k ≤ m, 1 ≤
i ≤ n.
Considering the busy interval ωk, the duration can be
calculated by equation 1. For any task τi, it may contribute
nothing, one ore more jobs to ωk, which means 0 ≤ Nk(τi).
Given the duration C(ωk) of the busy interval, the number of
jobs for the task τi depends on it’s period and execution time.
With knowing the period and the execution time of every task,
we can estimate the possible number of jobs for τi by applying
the following condition check equations:
(i) If Ck satisfies
(Nk(τi)pi − ci)+ ≤ Ck < Nk(τi)pi + ci, (2)
then busy interval ωk can only contain Nk(τi) jobs for the task
τi.
(ii) If Ck satisfies
Nk(τi)pi + ci ≤ Ck < (Nk(τi) + 1)pi − ci, (3)
then busy interval ωk can only contain Nk(τi) or Nk(τi) + 1
jobs for the task τi.
Note that Nk for each task is estimated separately and
independently here, and that is why, from the above equa-
tions, some tasks may have two candidate values: Nk(τi) or
Nk(τi) + 1. This ambiguity can only be eliminated when Nk
of all tasks are considered altogether.
Recall from equation (1), the duration of a busy interval is
sum of the number of jobs for each task times it’s execution
time. Therefore, in order to sort out the correct Nk values,
we apply all possible combinations to equation (1). In worst
case, there will be 2n possible combinations since one task
may have at most two candidate values. Eventually, only those
combinations that satisfy equation (1) are considered possible
answers.
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D. Inference of Arrival Time Windows
From the last step, the content for each busy interval is
obtained. However, it only infers possible combinations of jobs
without permutations, hence it’s not yet sufficient to accurately
plot whole schedule. In order to reconstruct the schedule, one
important step is to compute the arrival time for each job since
it is the fundamental for the fixed-priority (RM) scheduling.
However, inferring the arrival times from a schedule is not
intuitive since a task may be postponed or preempted due
to priority control from the scheduling algorithm. Therefore,
it’s more reasonable to compute the possible window for the
arrival time. Eventually we want to get a narrowed arrival time
window for each task in this step.
The arrival time window is estimated task by task. For one
task, the arrival time window of each job in each involved busy
interval is computed separately at first. Considering a task τi
and a busy interval ωk that has start time and end time equal
[a, b], the arrival time window of each existed job, Ak(τi)j ,
can be computed by:
(i) If Nk(τi) has only one possible value:
Ak(τi)j = [a+jpi,min{b−(Nk(τi)−1−j)pi−ci, a+(j+1)pi−ci}] 0 ≤ j ≤ Nk(τi)−1
(4)
(ii) If Nk(τi) has multiple possible values, that is Nk(τi) or
Nk(τi) + 1:
Ak(τi)j = [a+jpi, a+(j+1)pi−ci] 0 ≤ j ≤ Nk(τi)−1
(5)
Ak(τi)j = [a+ jpi, b− ci] j = Nk(τi) (6)
The computed arrival time windows of task τi are then
layered together to get the intersection. The result of such
process is a narrowed arrival time window A(τi). This polished
arrival time window is used to recompute the arrival time
window for each job of task τi in each busy interval, that
is restoring Ak(τi).
E. Reconstruction of Start Times (Reconstruct Schedule)
Once the arrival time of every job in each busy interval
is obtained, the reconstruction of the schedule is about to
complete. In this stage, every busy interval has sufficient
and independent information, thus it is possible to selectively
rebuild the schedule of any busy interval by using the compact
RM scheduling translator.
For a selected busy interval ωk, the compact RM scheduling
translator takes arrival times Ak and Γ as input to perform
RM scheduling algorithm. The Ak here can be interpreted
as a prearranged ready queue where the RM scheduler only
processes the given jobs. The output of this process is the start
times Sk for all jobs within busy interval ωk.
IV. EVALUATION
In order to effectively evaluate the developed schedule
reconstruction algorithms, we divide the evaluation into two
parts: on-board test and simulation test (synthetic test). The on-
board test is performed to validate the feasibility of the attack
scheme on a realistic platform, which includes the analysis
of the complexity and computation time of the implemented
program. On the other hand, the simulation is adopted to test
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